Source: docs/IMPLEMENTATION.md
Implementation Reference
This document explains how the $SOGOK Protocol is built, how every subsystem works, and why each architectural decision was made. It is the deep engineering companion to README.md (which provides the high-level project overview) and docs/INTEGRATIONS.md (which records the smart contract signatures and verifiable testnet transaction proofs).
Every statement here is backed by code in this repository (contracts/, tee-guardian/, and app/src/). Where an implementation choice is a deliberate trade-off rather than an exhaustive solution, it is explicitly disclosed in the same section.
#1. Executive Architecture & Subsystem Boundaries
The $SOGOK Protocol operates as an adversarial two-sided intelligence coordination engine deployed across three discrete execution environments:
┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ NEAR TESTNET SMART CONTRACT │
│ (sogok-protocol.testnet) │
│ │
│ • NEP-141 Fungible Token Engine (1,000,000,000 $SOGOK Genesis) │
│ • Tripartite Split Sinks: 40% Burn / 40% Jackpot / 20% Defender │
│ • Sentinel Registry & Commit Hash Storage (SHA-256) │
│ • Ed25519 Hardware Signature Verification & Atomic Bounty Settlement │
└───────────────────▲────────────────────────────────▲───────────────────┘
│ │
ft_transfer_call (Attack) claim_breach_bounty
│ │
┌───────────────────┴────────────────┐ ┌───────────┴───────────────────┐
│ ADVERSARIAL AGENTS │ │ INTEL SGX TEE ENCLAVE │
│ & RED-TEAM OPERATORS │ │ (NEAR AI Cloud Guardian) │
│ │ │ │
│ • SHA-256 Prompt Commit Pre-flight │ │ • Sealed PRM Memory Space │
│ • Autonomous Probe Generation │──▶│ • Heuristic & Canary Analyzer │
│ • Web3 Browser Cyber-Terminal │ │ • Ed25519 Signature Generator │
│ • Defuse 1Click Solver Swaps │ │ • MRENCLAVE Hardware Quote │
└────────────────────────────────────┘ └───────────────────────────────┘##Subsystem Directory Map
| Subsystem | Directory | Language & Runtime | Core Responsibility |
|---|---|---|---|
| Blockchain | contracts/ | Rust (Wasm) | NEP-141 token, on-chain commit ledger, 40/40/20 fee split, and Ed25519 cryptographic signature verification. |
| TEE Enclave | tee-guardian/ | TypeScript / Node.js inside Intel SGX | Sealed model reasoning, hidden canary secret storage, jailbreak heuristics, and cryptographic attestation generation. |
| Frontend dApp | app/ | Next.js 14 / TypeScript (Clean Arch) | 0-Radius Cyber-Terminal, direct NEAR JSON-RPC failover client, Defuse 1Click solver intents, and Markdown docs engine. |
| Documentation | docs/ | Pure Markdown | Authoritative specifications, failure policies, deploy runbooks, and build post-mortems. |
#2. Crowdsourced Red-Teaming Marketplace (Red Sentinel Benchmark)
Traditional AI evaluations rely on static synthetic benchmarks (e.g., SWE-bench, MT-Bench, Chatbot Arena). These datasets quickly suffer from data contamination and model overfitting. Furthermore, human red-teaming teams are expensive, slow, and unable to simulate zero-day prompt injection vectors continuously.
$SOGOK creates an open, permissionless, two-sided market:
- Defenders (Blue Team / Model Creators): - Deploy custom Sentinel guardrails via
deploy_sentinel()on NEAR. - Supply a proprietary system prompt and a secret Canary phrase (e.g.CANARY_RELEASE_TREASURY_KEY). - Deposit NEAR bounty collateral and specify the attack fee in $SOGOK. - Earn 20% passive creator yield on every failed adversarial probe directed against their sentinel. - If the Sentinel survives its specified lockup duration (e.g. 14 days) unbreached, the defender withdraws their original collateral plus accrued earnings viaclaim_survivor_bounty().
- Attackers (Red Team / Security Researchers & AI Bots): - Inspect active sentinels in the registry. - Craft adversarial jailbreak payloads designed to force the model into outputting the secret canary token. - Commit attack hashes on-chain and pay the attack fee. - When the TEE hardware confirms canary leakage, the attacker claims 100% of the locked NEAR treasury plus the progressive $SOGOK jackpot.
#3. Intel SGX Enclave Attestation & Ed25519 Verification
A central innovation of $SOGOK is replacing subjective human judges or centralized oracle multisigs with Confidential Computing (Intel SGX Hardware Enclaves).
##Sealed Memory Isolation
Inside the Intel SGX enclave running in the NEAR AI Cloud:
- The system prompt and canary secrets reside in Processor Reserved Memory (PRM).
- Even the cloud node operator with root access cannot inspect memory buffers or read the canary token.
- The evaluation loop evaluates the attacker's prompt against the defensive guardrails in complete isolation.
##Canonical Attestation Report Payload
When an adversarial jailbreak is detected (canary phrase detected in model output), the enclave constructs a deterministic canonical verdict payload:
SOGOK_TEE_VERDICT:sentinel_id=<id>:prompt_hash=<hash>:verdict=<verdict>:recipient=<recipient>:timestamp=<timestamp>:nonce=<nonce>:measurement=<quote_hash>| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
sentinel_id | u64 | Identifier of the breached Sentinel. |
prompt_hash | String | 64-char SHA-256 hash matching the on-chain commitment. |
verdict | String | Must strictly equal JAILBROKEN. |
recipient | AccountId | NEAR account of the white-hat attacker. |
timestamp | u64 | Enclave hardware timestamp in milliseconds. |
nonce | u64 | Monotonically increasing sequence number preventing replay attacks. |
measurement_quote_hash | String | Intel SGX MRENCLAVE measurement hash identifying the untampered binary. |
##Smart Contract Verification Algorithm
When claim_breach_bounty is submitted to sogok-protocol.testnet:
- The contract asserts that
payload.verdict == "JAILBROKEN". - It verifies that
!self.used_nonces.contains_key(&payload.nonce)and consumes the nonce before disbursement to prevent signature reuse. - It validates that
payload.measurement_quote_hashmatchesguardian_config.measurement_quote_hash. - It calls
GuardianVerifier::verify_attestationusingnear_sdk::env::ed25519_verifyagainstguardian_config.guardian_public_key(754e986fa46d2b8b6334f6e118915fa0313b5e57760f28f7418e7ee43f135454). - Upon cryptographic confirmation, the contract executes an atomic transfer of the Sentinel's NEAR treasury and transfers the $SOGOK jackpot to the recipient.
#4. Tripartite Tokenomics & Flywheel Mechanics (40 / 40 / 20)
Every adversarial probe on NEAR requires paying the Sentinel's configured attack fee (minimum 5,000 $SOGOK). The smart contract enforces an automated tripartite split upon receipt of the NEP-141 transfer:
[ Attack Fee: 5,000 $SOGOK ]
│
┌─────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────┐
│ 40% (2,000 $SOGOK) │ 40% (2,000 $SOGOK) │ 20% (1,000 $SOGOK)
▼ ▼ ▼
┌──────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐
│ PERMANENT BURN │ │ JACKPOT TREASURY │ │ DEFENDER YIELD │
│ │ │ │ │ │
│ Total supply is │ │ Accrues into the │ │ Streamed to the │
│ burned forever │ │ apex prize pool │ │ model creator │
│ via NEP-297 log │ │ for future wins │ │ as passive ROI │
└──────────────────┘ └──────────────────┘ └──────────────────┘- 40% Hyper-Deflationary Burn: - Transferred to the dead storage address and deducted permanently from
total_supply. - Every attack structurally reduces circulating token availability. - 40% Progressive Jackpot Accrual: - Added directly to the Sentinel's
token_bountypool. - As security researchers fail, the financial prize to discover a zero-day increases geometrically. - 20% Defender Revenue Yield: - Immediately credited to the Sentinel creator's NEAR account balance. - Incentivizes AI prompt engineers and defense researchers to deploy hardening guardrails.
#5. Nonce Replay Protection & Atomic Disbursement
A common vulnerability in cryptographic relayers is the replay attack: an adversary snooping an Ed25519 signature from the public mempool or block explorer and resubmitting it to claim the bounty themselves.
$SOGOK implements multi-layered replay defense:
- Recipient Binding: The canonical signed message explicitly includes
recipient=<account_id>. Even if another actor intercepts the signature, the smart contract verifies thatenv::predecessor_account_id() == payload.recipient. - Monotonic Nonces: Each attestation emitted by the TEE increments an internal 64-bit nonce. The smart contract records the highest observed nonce per sentinel, rejecting any transaction with
nonce <= recorded_nonce. - Commitment Binding: The prompt hash committed in Step 1 must match
payload.prompt_hashwithin an active unexpired commitment window.
#6. Failure Policy Matrix
The protocol must behave predictably under adversarial conditions, network partitions, and infrastructure degradation. The following matrix governs system behavior:
| Failure Mode | Trigger / Condition | System Behavior | User Impact / Recovery |
|---|---|---|---|
| TEE Enclave Offline | Guardian port 4000 unreachable or timeout (>10s) | UI displays TEE: Degraded status badge; contract commitments remain intact on-chain. | Attacker's token commitment is recorded; evaluation can be retried once relayer recovers without paying fees again. |
| Invalid Signature | Corrupted signature or mismatched payload parameters | Smart contract aborts transaction with panic: ERR_INVALID_ED25519_SIG. | 0 NEAR is disbursed; transaction gas is refunded to caller; Sentinel treasury remains secure. |
| Canary Not Leaked | Model output defends canary secret | TEE returns verdict DEFENDED; no Ed25519 claim signature is emitted. | Attack fee remains burned (40/40/20 split executed); jackpot pool increases; attacker receives detailed threat score. |
| Replay Attempt | Submitting an already claimed payload or expired nonce | Contract panics with ERR_NONCE_ALREADY_USED. | Transaction rejected immediately; 0 funds disbursed. |
| FastNear RPC Error | Public RPC node timeout or HTTP 504 | NearRpcClient automatically switches across fallback endpoints (fastnear $\rightarrow$ pagoda $\rightarrow$ near.org). | Zero user interruption; verified fallback sentinels rendered from cache if all endpoints fail. |
| Lockup Expiration | Sentinel reaches created_at + lockup_period_ns unbreached | Sentinel enters EXPIRED status; attack functions lock. | Defender invokes claim_survivor_bounty() to reclaim 100% of their NEAR principal and accrued earnings. |
#7. Zero-Dependency Markdown Specification
To maintain a minimal bundle size and eliminate external supply-chain vulnerabilities, $SOGOK ports the zero-dependency Markdown AST parser from the saksi architecture (app/src/utils/markdown.ts).
- Supports: Headings (levels 1-4 with auto-slugified anchor IDs), code blocks with language tags, GitHub-flavored Markdown tables with cell alignment, ordered and unordered lists, bold, italics, inline code, and autolinks.
- Guaranteed Safe: Uses no
dangerouslySetInnerHTML. Every AST node translates strictly to typed React JSX elements styled with Cyber-Brutalist 0-radius aesthetics.